Written by Masoninblue and published full-text here with permission. However, I chose the music for the post. To listen as you read, simply click on the video;you do not have to watch it. By the way,if you are a judge and you are following this case,and you have seen anything like this,please emailme privately with the citation;I would like to see it. My email listed in the About section of this site. Thank you,Rachel, aka Crane-Station.
The Curious Case of the Three Suppression Orders (Part 3)
Author’s Note: Judge Clymer surprised us with a third suppression order that he issued out of the blue 3 days after the trial concluded. He did not inform us that he was considering modifying his second order and he did not schedule a hearing, request any input or allow any discussion or objections. He simply mailed it out as one might do with a letter bomb.
The order consists of the judge’s personal opinions set forth as findings of fact in a transparent effort to strengthen his order denying suppression by making stuff up and characterizing it as “unusual, suspicious, and disturbing,” even though Deputy McGuire never uttered those words at the suppression hearing. He even uses the word appellant, instead of defendant, obviously anticipating an appeal.
During my 30 years representing clients charged with felonies in state and federal courts, I never had a case in which a judge did this and I never heard of a case in which a judge did something like this.
3. The Third Suppression Order Issued Post-Trial on January 28, 2008.
In his third suppression order, the supplemental suppression order, Judge Clymer modified his first finding of fact in the second order (that correctly quoted what the caller reported to 911) by eliminating the quote and replacing it with the following statement.
The 911 dispatcher received a call from an identified public citizen, Vernon Wilkey, who reported that a white female driving a dark blue LeSabre with Washington State license plates made unusual and disturbing statements about heroin in his neighborhood.
(Finding of Fact 1)
Finding of Fact 2 states,
911 called deputies, and alerted them to the woman, her vehicle, and her suspicious drug activity.
Finding of Fact 3 characterizes the appellant’s driving and states,
The vehicle was travelling slowly in the right traffic lane of Highway 60 with the left-turn signal activated for an unusually long time for no apparent reason. The vehicle did not turn left, but continued on straight, which all appeared unusual and suspicious to the deputy.
Finding of Fact 4 (mis-numbered as a second 3) states,
The vehicle then pulled to the right side of the road and stopped without any signaling to do so by the deputy. This demonstrated additional unusual behavior by the appellant. The deputy then pulled in behind the appellant’s vehicle and activated his roadstop lights. By the time the deputy stopped, he had reasonable grounds and reasonable suspicion to approach the driver. He exited his cruiser and walked to speak to the driver.
Finding of Fact 5 (mis-numbered as 4) states in part,
The appellant failed all HGN tests. She also gave unusual responses to instructions given to her by the deputy; she appeared somewhat confused; she appeared nervous; and she appeared to the deputy to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Finding of Fact 6 (mis-numbered as 5) states,
The appellant admitted to the deputy that she was on a number of medications, including Clonazepam. Clonazepam is a strong anti-psychotic medication which interferes with motor performance, including driving a motor vehicle. Clonazepam also causes abnormal eye movements.
Finding of Fact 7 (mis-numbered as 6) states,
The deputy had reasonable grounds and probable cause to arrest the appellant for DUI.
Finding of Fact 8 (mis-numbered as 7) states,
The appellant was transported to the hospital for the taking of a blood test. At the hospital a suspicious baggie was found next to the appellant’s watch in the back seat of the deputy’s patrol car. The deputy knew that the patrol cruiser did not have the suspicious plastic baggie or a watch before the appellant was placed into the back seat. The appellant admitted losing her watch. The deputy had probable cause and exigent reasons to seize the baggie. The baggie appeared to contain crack cocaine. The deputy had probable cause to arrest the appellant for tampering with evidence and possession of cocaine.
Conclusion of Law 1:
The caller who reported the appellant’s unusual interest in heroin was identified. Such a report is considered more reliable than an anonymous tip.
Conclusion of Law 2:
The deputy had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make an investigation stop and search of the appellant and her vehicle.
Conclusion of Law 3:
Discovery of the suspicious plastic baggie in the back seat of the deputy’s cruiser was based on plain view discovery. The appellant and her vehicle had previously been detained based on the circumstances described above which proceeded (sic) the discovery of the baggie.
Author’s Note: We have previously discussed Deputy McGuire’s testimony under oath at the preliminary hearing in which he said he found the rock of crack under his rear seat while he was looking for Crane-Station’s watch that she had asked him to retrieve for her.
I was confident that the Court of Appeals would reverse on the suppression issue in this”unusual, suspicious, and disturbing” case, but it did not, and that is when I lost hope for an honest and judicious review of her case.
If this could happen to Crane-Station, it can happen to you. We are all lost when our judicial system ceases to function.
